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Blocking Payment on a Certified, Cashier's, or 
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[Vol. 73:424 
'When disputes arise between buyers and sellers over completed 
commercial transactions and payment has been delivered to the seller 
in the form of a negotiable instrument,1 a dissatisfied buyer may seek 
to suspend the instrument's payment obligation.2 By blocking pay-
ment the buyer strengthens his bargaining position and prevents the 
seller from dissipating the proceeds of the sale before the buyer can 
establish the merit of his claim. Blocking payment forces the seller 
to enforce the commercial agreement through court action8 or satisfy 
the buyer's grievances.4 
When the buyer pays with a personal check, his right to compel 
the drawee bank to stop payment is protected by statute.0 The payee's 
remedy on the check is against the buyer only; the bank is not re-
sponsible. a· Sellers wary of the buyer's control over a personal check 
may insist on payment in the form of a certified, cashier's, or bank 
check (hereinafter business check).7 A certified check is a personal 
check drawn by a depositor on his account and signed by an autho-
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter UCCJ § 3-104(1) provides the basic 
definition of a negotiable instrument: 
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must 
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money 
and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or 
drawer except as authorized by this Article; and 
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(d) be payable to order or to bearer. 
2. It will be assumed, for the purpose of discussing the problems raised in this note, 
that the seller always has possession of the payment instrument. 
3. The seller can sue a maker, drawer, or acceptor on the instrument under UCC 
§ 3-413, or, in the alternative and in specified circumstances, he can sue the buyer on 
the underlying contractual obligation. UCC § 3-802(l)(b). 
4. The seller may also seek to void the agreement, either by self-help or through 
judicial procedures. For example, he can withhold delivery of the goods, Portal Gal• 
laries, Inc. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 523, 302 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1969); 
UCC § 2-703(a), secure a judgment levy on goods that have been delivered, or, in some 
circumstances, personally repossess the delivered property. Girard v. Anderson, 219 
Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934): Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 277, 282 
N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1967), afld., 29 App. Div. 2d 767, 288 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1968); UCC 
§ 9-503. 
5. "A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item payable for his 
account but the order must be received at such time and in such manner as to afford 
the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it prior to any action by the bank with 
respect to the item described in Section 4-303." UCC § 4-403(1). 
6. "A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds 
in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable on 
the instrument until he accepts it." UCC § 3-409(1). See also UCC § 3-410. 
7. The lack of security of payment on personal checks has caused sellers to require 
with increasing frequency that payment be made by certified check. Roberts &: Morris, 
The Effect of a Stop Payment Order on a Certified Check, 5 WYO. L.J. 170, 170 (1951). 
From a seller's viewpoint, a cashier's check and a bank check offer the same security of 
payment as a certified check. See text at notes 12-18 infra. 
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rized bank officer.8 The officer's signature constitutes a legal accep-
tance _of the check, 9 and creates contractual privity between the 
check payee and the drawee bank.10 The sum charged to the check 
is withdrawn by the bank from the drawer's account and held as a 
deposit to the credit of the check.11 A cashiers check is drawn by a 
bank upon its own funds at the solicitation of a purchasing cus-
tomer .12 It is issued by an authorized officer of the bank and autho-
rizes the payee to demand and receive from the bank, upon pre-
sentation of the instrument, the amount of money represented by 
the check.18 The bank, as drawer and drawee of the check, is pri-
marily liable to the payee for the check's stated amount.14 A bank 
check or draft is drawn by one bank on its account with another 
bank at the solicitation of its customer.15 If the drawee bank refuses 
to honor the check, the drawer bank is liable for the amount stated 
on the instrument.16 All three instruments allow the payee-seller to 
8. J. BRADY, THE LAW OF BANK CHECKS 148 (4th ed. H. Bailey 1969). 
9. "Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as presented. 
It must be written on the draft, and may consist of his signature alone. It becomes 
operative when completed by delivery or notification." UCC § 3-410(1). 
IO. The drawee-bank, as an "acceptor," enters into a statutory contract with the 
payee. "The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instrument according to its 
tenor at the time of his engagement or as completed pursuant to Section 3-115 on 
incomplete instruments." UCC § 3-413(1). 
11. J. BRADY, supra note 8, § 7.1, at 148-49. 
12. Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Natl. Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1970); Kaufman 
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); J. BRADY, supra note 
8, § 1.6, at 10. 
13. National Newark&: Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 350, 268 A.2d 
327, 328 (L. Div. 1970). 
14. Most courts simply state that the act of issuance constitutes an acceptance by 
the issuing bank for the purpose of UCC § 3-413(1). E.g., Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Natl. 
Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1970); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 
F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). One court has stated that the signature of an 
authorized employee of the issuing bank on a cashier's check constitutes acceptance 
under UCC § 3-410(1). National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 
347, 351, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (L. Div. 1970). As an "acceptor," the issuing bank enters 
into a statutory contract with the payee "to pay the instrument according to its tenor 
at the time of engagement." UCC § 3-413(1). See note 10 supra. 
An alternative explanation for the bank's contractual liability on a bank check 
could be that the bank as a drawer is obligated to pay the amount of the draft under 
UCC § 3-413(2): "The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any nec-
essary notice of dishonor or protest that he will pay the amount of the draft to the 
holder or to any indorser who takes it up." 
15. J. BRADY, supra note 8, § 1.6, at 10. 
16. UCC § 3-413(2). See note 14 supra. The· courts are in conflict over the drawer 
bank's right to issue a stop-payment order to the drawee bank. Two New York lower 
court cases held that the drawer bank does not have the right. Ruskin v. Central Fed. 
Sav. &: Loan Assn., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Malpbrus v. Home Sav. 
Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965). A Georgia appeals 
court disagreed, holding that a bank that draws a check on a second bank is a 
"customer" under UCC § 4-104(l)(e), and therefore is entitled to stop payment on its 
check under UCC § 4-403. Fulton Natl. Bank v. Delco Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 18, 195 
S.E.2d 455, 457 (1973). Even if the drawer bank can issue a stop-payment order, however, 
426 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:424 
recover on the instrument from a solvent bank if the check is not 
honored.17 They thus offer more certainty of payment than a per-
sonal check when in the seller's hands, and are regarded as a near 
equivalent of cash.18 
The bank's status as drawer or acceptor on business checks de-
nies the buyer-customer the right to issue a binding stop payment 
order on the check. Section 4-303 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(Code) explicitly states that a stop order "comes too late" if the 
drawee has accepted or certified the check, as is the case with certi-
:fied19 and cashier's checks.20 A bank check is not an "item payable 
for his [the buyer-customer's] account,"21 and therefore is not subject 
to a stop payment order under section 4-403(1 ). 
Although deprived of the statutory right to stop payment, the 
buyer can attempt to persuade the issuing or certifying bank to 
withhold payment. While banks want to maintain their reputation 
by having their business checks accepted as cash, they also wish to 
provide their customers with protective services in specific cir-
cumstances.22 I£ the aggrieved buyer convinces the issuing bank to 
breach its contract with the payee-seller on a business check, and 
the payee-seller subsequently sues the bank for payment, the bank 
it remains contractually liable on the instrument under UCC § 8-413(2) as a drawer. 
Fulton Natl. :Bank v. Delco Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455 (1973); J. WlllTE 
&: R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF nm LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 580 
(1972). 
17. Acceptance of a business check is complete upon delivery of the check or 
notification to the payee, UCC § 3-410(1), and drawer liability is established upon 
delivery of the check. See Ryan v. Ryan, 298 A.2d 343 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); UCC 
§§ 1-201(20); 8-410(1), Comment 4; 3-603(1). 
In fact, the buyer is released from all payment liability to the seller unless the 
seller has procured the buyer's endorsement: "Unless othenvise agreed where an in• 
strumcnt is taken for an underlying obligation (a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged 
if a bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse on 
the instrument against the underlying obligor •••• " UCC § 3-802(1)(a). 
18. J. WHITE &: R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 579 n.91; Roberts &: Morris, supra 
note 7, at 170. 
19. See text at notes 10-11 supra. 
20. See note 14 supra. 
21. A bank check is credited to the drawer bank's account with the drawee bank. 
See text at notes 15-16 supra. 
22. Certainly it is in a bank's best interest to have its cashiers checks and checks 
certified by it accepted without question as the equivalent of cash in the settle-
ment of commercial and consumer transactions and we cannot ronceive of a bank 
refusingJ'ayment of any such check merely to accommodate a customer who feels 
aggrieve by the payee's action or non-action in the underlying transaction. It 
must be recognized, however, that, in very rare instances, transactions may be so 
charged with fraud or similar criminal activity, a bank might decide it would be 
unconscionable to effect payment of such checks. There are, of course, other 
equitable considerations which might dictate the dishonoring of such checks. 
Letter from Thomas J. McNanus, Assistant Resident Counsel, Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company of New York, to the Michigan Law Review, April 11, 1974 [hereinafter 
McNanus Letter]. 
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may seek to raise the defenses of its customer with respect to the 
obligation underlying the check. If the bank cannot be persuaded 
to withhold payment, the buyer may seek to prevent payment by 
asserting an "adverse claim." These procedures, if routinely avail-
able, would vest in the buyer a good deal of control over the funds 
credited to a business check, and would significantly dilute a busi-
ness check's similarity to cash. The business check would be opera-
tionally similar to a personal check; the only remaining difference 
would be that a bank and not the buyer would be liable if the 
seller-payee is successful in a suit on the merits. However, the right 
of a bank to raise its customer's claims and defenses, and the avail-
ability of the adverse claim doctrine; are unclear. This note will 
investigate the rights and obligations of the three basic parties 
involved-the bank,23 the buyer-customer,24 and the seller-payee25-
under present law, and suggest amendments to the Code that will 
clarify those rights and balance the interests of the parties in light 
of the Code's basic policy objectives. 
The ability of an obligor (e.g., the bank) to raise a defense on 
an instrument (e.g., a business check) based upon the rights of a 
third party (e.g., the buyer-customer) is rooted in the common law 
doctrine of jus tertii.26 Under that doctrine the defendant admits that 
he owes a debt on the instrument but denies that he owes it to the 
plaintiff because of a superior outstanding right in a third party.27 
By asserting the rights of the third party the defendant seeks to prove 
that the plaintiff's title to the instrument is either defective or non-
existent: 28 
23. It is assumed here that the bank that issues or certifies the business check 
is also the recipient of the seller's initial payment demands; it is the depositary, collect-
-ing, and presenting bank, as well as the drawee bank. See UCC § 4-105; J. WHITE&: 
R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 493. 
24. The buyer-customer is the person who procures the business check with a view 
to delivering the check in fulfillment of contractual payment obligations. He is the 
drawer of a certified check, see text at notes 8-14 supra, or the remitter of a cashier's 
or a bank check. See w. BRITTON, HANDBOOK, OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES § 75, at 
177 (2d ed. 1961). 
25. It is assumed that the payee of the delivered business check is receiving the 
check as consideration pursuant to a contract, and that he has not endorsed the instru-
ment to another party. If the instrument has been endorsed to a third party, that party 
may qualify as a holder in due course, UCC § 3-302, and will take the instrument free 
from "all claims" and "all defenses" of the buyer. UCC § 3-305. The payee of a busi-
ness check may also be a holder in due course, UCC § 3-302(2), if he satisfies the re-
quirements of UCC § 3-302(1). See especially Comment 2a. However, if the payee has 
"dealt" with the buyer, he is not entitled to the rights of a holder in due course as 
against the buyer, UCC § 3-305(2), and his rights will be defined under UCC § 3-306. 
Cf. Hall v. Westmoreland, Hall 8: Bryan, 123 Ga. App. 809, 182 S.E.2d 539 (1971). 
26. ]us tertii literally means the right of a third party. BLACK'S LAW DrcrIONAR.Y 
1000 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
27. Note, ]us Tertii Under Common Law and the N.I.L., 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 135, 
135 (1951). 
28. Id. 
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The nature of the third-party right alleged is crucial to a suc-
cessful jus tertii defense. The defendant will prevail if he can prove 
that legal title to the instrument, as opposed to equitable title or 
a contract defense,29 is in a third party.80 A common case for the 
application of jus tertii arises when a drawer prepares a negotiable 
instrument payable to a specified party and a thief steals it from 
the drawer or payee, forges the payee's endorsement, and attempts 
to secure payment by presenting the check to a collecting bank.81 
An instrument with a forged endorsement is considered wholly in-
operative; the possessor has no right to retain it or to enforce pay-
ment against any party to it.82 The obligor on the instrument, by 
proving that the third party's legal title to the instrument is superior 
to that of the thief, avoids tendering payment.83 
29. The classic definitions of legal title, equitable title, and contract defenses as 
applied to negotiable instruments were given by Zechariah Chafee, Jr., in 1918, 
W. BIU1TON, supra note 24, at 456-62. · 
Chafee formulated the following definition of legal title: "The legal title to a 
negotiable instrument throughout its existence belongs to the person to whom the 
promises run by the terms of the instrument if he has possession, no matter how that 
possession came to him." Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HARV. L. REv. 1104, 
1112 (1918). Under this formulation a thief has legal title to a negotiable instrument 
payable to bearer or_ endorsed in blank, but a possessor under a forged instrument has 
no legal title because he is not a promisee under the terms of the instrument. 
Chafee's distinction between equities of ownership and equities of defense is based 
on the dual nature of a negotiable instrument. Equities of ownership relate to the 
instrument as a chattel: 
It is a chattel, a tangible scrap of paper, sometimes valuable for its own sake 
if sufficiently ancient or bearing the autograph of some historic debtor ••• , always 
available for framing or even papering the walls, for which purpose unlucky in-
vestors have used their coupon bonds. As a chattel, it is the subject of conversion 
which gives rise to trover, has been held to be covered by the desii;nation 
"goods and chattels" in the Statute of Frauds, and is taxable where situated, 
though the owner and the obligor reside elsewhere. 
Id. at 1109. Any equitable claim of right to possession of the actual paper is a claim 
of equitable ownership. For example, if the payee of an instrument is induced by 
fraud to endorse and deliver the instrument to a third party, the payee has an equitable 
right to restitution of the document. 
Equities of defense relate to the negotiable instrument as a "bundle of contracts," 
Id. "Instead of being property rights ••• , they are set up ·by a defendant as defenses 
••• to litigation on a contract." Id. at 1111. Equities of defense are the ordinary per• 
sonal defenses, such as failure of consideration, fraud, duress, nonfulfillment of a con• 
dition precedent, that can be asserted by a party of a commercial transaction to void 
his payment instrument. 
30. E.g., Lum v. Robertson, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 277 (1867); Bond v. Maxwell, 40 Ga. 
App. 679, 150 S.E. 860 (1929); Hays v. Hathorn, 74 N.Y. 486 (1878). See Note, supra 
note 27, at 139. 
31. E.g., Lancaster v. Baltzell, 28 Am. Dec. 233 (Md. 1836); Corn Exch. Dank v. 
Nassau Bank, 91 N.Y. 74 (1883). See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 492. 
A second common application of the doctrine occurs when an instrument payable 
to a corporation is endorsed by an unauthorized corporate officer or agent. See, e.g., 
Gilbert v. Miller, 68 Cal. App. 40, 228 P. 662 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924); Hirch v. Allendor.f, 
117 N.JL. 404, 189 A. 82 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937). 
32. Lancaster v. Baltzell, 28 Am. Dec. 233 (Md. 1836); Corn Exch. Bank v. Nassau 
Bank, 91 N.Y. 74 (1883). 
33. E.g., Gilbert v. Miller, 68 Cal. App. 40, 228 P. 662 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924); Bond 
December 1974] Notes 429 
The weight of authority at common law would not allow an 
obligor to defend by pleading that the instrument is subject to an 
equity of ownership or a contractual defense in a third party.34 
Courts and commentators have advanced several reasons for this 
limitation, including protecting the defendant from double liabil-
ity, 85 eliminating relitigation on the same issues in a separate suit 
by the third party against either the obligor or the instrument 
holder,88 protecting the obligor who is unaware of the third party's 
claims,37 and precluding the obligor from escaping all liability 
by prevailing against the plaintiff on a third-party defense and against 
the third party in a separate suit.38 These arguments, however, can 
also be used to attack the jus tertii defense when it is based on a 
third party's legal title.so 
A more convincing reason exists for the distinction between 
claims of legal and equitable title. If the obligor tenders payment 
on a forged signature to one who does not possess legal title to the 
instrument, the obligor is liable for the paid amount to the rightful 
payee under the doctrine of conversion.40 The obligor, therefore, 
must verify the claimant's title at its peril; an incorrect assessment 
might subject the obligor to double liability.41 The law creates a 
v. Maxwell, 40 Ga. App. 679, 150 S.E. 860 (1929); Lancaster v. Baltzell, 28 Am. Dec. 
233 (Md. 1836); Hays v. Hathorn, 74 N.Y. 486 (1878). 
34. E.g., Caldwell v. Lawrence, 84 m. 161 (1876); Richards v. Betzer, 53 m. 466 
(1870); Prouty v. Roberts, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 19 (1850); Brown v. Penfield, 36 N.Y. 
472 (1867); J. BRANNAN, NF.COTIAl3LE INSI'RUMENTS LAw § 59, at 884-85 {7th ed. 1948). 
Contra, Parsons v. Utica Cement Mfg. Co., 82 Conn. 333, 73 A. 785 (1909); Merchant's 
Exch. Natl. Bank v. New Brunswick Sav. Inst., 33 N.J.L. 170 (Sup. Ct. 1868). 
35. Allowing jus tertii might mean that the defendant cannot simply discharge 
his obligation by payment to the plaintiff. For example, if the defendant fails success-
fully to assert jus tertii, the third party, in a later suit, may sue the defendant for pay-
ing the wrong party, for the earlier judgment is not binding upon the owner of the 
outstanding equity. Denying jus tertii frees the obligor from a potential duty to assert 
third party claims. W. BRl1ToN, supra note 24, § 159, at 468. Cf. Gilbert v. Miller, 68 
Cal. App. 40, 45, 228 P. 662, 664 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924). 
36. Either the successful plaintiff, see Note, Personal Money Orders and Teller's 
Checks: Mavericks Under the U.C.C., 67 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 524, 544 (1967), or the unsuc-
cessful defendant-obligor, see materials cited note 34 supra, may be liable in a suit by 
the third party. 
37. See W. BR11ToN, supra note 24, § 159, at 468. Cf. Gage v. Kendall, 15 Wend. 640 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836). 
38. Note, supra note 27, at 137. Cf. City Bank v. Perkins, 29 N.Y. 554, 567 (1864). 
39. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Miller, 68 Cal App. 40, 45, 228 P. 662, 664 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1924); City Bank v. Perkins, 29 N.Y. 554, 567 (1864). 
40. E.g., FDIC v. Marine Natl, Bank, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970) (instrument lacked 
endorsement of joint payee); Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker-Citizens Natl. 
Bank, 253 Cal. App. 2d· 368, 61 Cal Rptr. 381 (Ct. App. 1967) (forgery); Salsman v. 
National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162 (L. Div. 1968), affd., 105 
N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (App. Div. 1969) (unauthorized signature); UCC § 3--419 
(l)(c} ("An instrument is converted when ••• it is paid on a forged indorsement.'). 
41. The payor (obligor), however, would have the right to recover on a quasi-
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strong incentive for the bank to follow carefully a negotiable in-
strument's directions in paying the party or parties with legal title. 
A necessary corollary to potential liability for conversion is the obli-
gor's ability to protect himself by defeating an instrument possessor's 
claim for payment by asserting that legal title is in a third party. 
On the other hand, when the third party asserts equitable title 
and the instrument possessor has legal title, the obligor (assuming 
he has no notice of the claims) may tender payment to the possessor 
in discharge of his liability on the instrument without incurring the 
risk of subsequent liability to the third party.42 Under common law 
the obligor is required to withhold payment on the instrument only 
if it is notified of the third-party claims,43 or, under the Code, only 
if the third party secures a court order restraining payment or prof-
fers a bond indemnifying the bank against loss.44 Even then the 
obligor does not have to raise jus tertii; payment is simply withheld 
for a reasonable time to enable the third-party claimant to seek his 
own judicial remedies.45 These rules have merit, for a tremendous 
burden would be placed on the obligor if it were held liable to a 
third party alleging an equitable claim because it (the obligor) failed 
to assert a successful jus tertii defense against a possessor. The obligor 
would be forced to ascertain, raise, and argue all of the third party's 
allegations in a suit initiated by the possessor of the instrument. The 
dispute may involve an alleged breach of warranty, a claim of inade-
quate performance, or another of the numerous controversies that 
may arise benveen parties to a commercial transaction. Where the 
dispute involves legal title the conversion doctrine forces the obligor 
to investigate only the identity and authorization of the instrument 
bearer, but where equitable title is involved the obligor would be 
forced to intervene in a multifaceted dispute between other parties. 
The cases under the Negotiable Instruments Law46 were split 
contract theory the sum erroneously paid to the party without legal title, W. BRITION, 
supra note 24, § 159, at 468. The bank can always protect itself by refusing to honor 
the instrument, but unjustified refusals to pay cast doubt on the security of the bank's 
services. See McNanus Letter, supra note 22. Cf. Ross v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 264 
F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1959). 
42. 2 T. PATON, PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1656 (rev. 1942). 
43. See text at notes 83-84 infra. 
44. See te.xt at note 100 infra. 
45. Gendler v. Sibley State Bank, 62 F. Supp. 805, 810 (N.D. Iowa 1945); Drumm• 
Flats Comm. v. Gerlach Bank, 107 Mo. App. 426, 433-34, 81 S.W. 503, 505 (1904). 
46. The Negotiable Instruments Law was the first American uniform code on 
commercial paper. It was drafted by John J. Crawford and adopted by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Between 1898 and 1924 it was 
adopted by all fifty states, but amendments and conflicting judicial interpretations 
became so frequent that its uniformity from state to state was destroyed. See J. BRAN• 
NAN, supra note 34, at 73-90. The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted by all states 
except Louisiana by 1968, has superseded the Negotiable Instruments Law. 
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on the applicability of the jus tertii doctrine. Several cases asserted 
its demise and held that a drawee sued by the payee could not set 
up the defenses of the drawer against the payee.47 However, in the 
leading case of Sutter v. Security Trust Co.,48 the court stated in 
dictum that if certification has been procured by the drawer of the 
check, "the bank can urge and have the benefit of any defense that 
the drawer could have against the payee, establishing that such payee 
obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, 
or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal con-
sideration."49 The case established the applicability of the jus tertii 
doctrine under the Negotiable Instruments Law, and expanded the 
doctrine by eliminating the common law distinction between legal 
title and equitable title claims. Although the court limited its 
opinion to checks certified by the drawer, as opposed to -those cer-
tified by the payee or the holder, 60 many courts adopted the dictum 
without the limitation. 61 
The Uniform Co~mercial Code, which superseded the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, 62 limited the Sutter case and returned to 
the common-law outlines of the jus tertii doctrine. Section 3-306(d) 
states that the obligor may raise the defenses that the instrument 
was acquired by theft or that payment would be inconsistent with 
the terms of a restrictive endorsement, but "[t]he claim of any third 
person to the instrument is not othenvise available as a defense to 
any party liable thereon •... " Justification for the provision is 
offered by Comment 5: "The exception made in the case of theft is 
based on the policy which refuses to aid a proved thief to recover, 
and refuses to aid him indirectly by permitting his transferee to 
recover unless the transferee is a holder in due course." The Sutter 
doctrine, allowing the assertion of jus tertii for equitable title claims, 
was rejected because 
[t]he contract of the obligor is to pay the holder of the instrument, 
and the claims of other persons against the holder are generally not 
his concern. He is not required to set up such a claim as a defense, 
since he usually will have no satisfactory evidence of his own on the 
issue; and the provision that he may not do so is intended as much 
for his protection as for that of the holder.63 
47. E.g., Jones v. National Banlc, 95 N.J.L. 376, 113 A. 702 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Bullet 
v. Allegheny Trust Co., 284 Pa. 561, 131 A. 471 (1925). 
48. 96 N.J. Eq. 644, 126 A. 435 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1924). 
49. 96 N.J. Eq. at 648, 126 A. at 437. 
50. 96 N.J. Eq. at 647, 126 A. at 437. 
51. E.g., Leo Syntax Auto Sales, Inc. v. Peoples Banlc &: Sav. Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 226, 
215 N.E.2d 68 (C.P. 1965). See also Kup Winston v. Kasper Am. State Banlc, 36 Ill. 
App. 2d 423, 184 N.E.2d 725 (1962). 
52. See note 46 supra. 
53. UCC § 3-306, Comment 5. 
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Section 3-306(d) is thus a codification, with historical rationale in-
tact, of earlier case law that allowed the obligor of a negotiable 
instrument to raise only the jus tertii defense of legal title. 
The common law grafts one significant exception onto the jus 
tertii doctrine, however: ]us tertii is allowed when the third party 
asserts equitable ownership54 of the negotiable instrument if he is 
brought into the suit between the obligor and payee.Im When the 
third party has been joined, 56 when interpleader has been requested 
and granted, 57 or when the third party has intervened in the suit, Gs 
the difficulties with allowing jus tertii for equitable title claims dis-
appear. The third party's submission to the jurisdiction of the court 
greatly reduces the obligor's evidentiary burden. Presumably the 
third party, because he will be bound by the judgment, will present 
his claims fully, and the obligor can assume a passive role in the 
proceedings.59 Furthermore, the presence of the third party allows 
the court to settle the dispute finally between all parties. Relitiga-
tion between any of the involved parties is foreclosed, eliminating 
54. See note 29 supra. 
55. E.g., Horrigan v. Wyman, 90 Mich. 121, 51 N.W. 187 (1892); Bathgate v. Exchange 
Bank, 199 Mo. App. 583,. 205 S.W. 875 (1918); Merchants Exch. Natl. Dank v. New 
Brunswick Sav. Inst., 33 N.J.L. 170 (Sup. Ct. 1868). See J. BRANNAN, supra note 34, § 59. 
56. Modern court rules allow liberal joinder of defendants. It is commonly pro-
vided that parties may be joined if they are claimed to be jointly or severally liable 
on the basis of the same transaction or occurrence, and if any question of law or fact 
common to them will arise in the action. E.g., Fulton Natl. Dank v. Delco Corp., 128 
Ga. App. 16, 17, 195 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1973); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 379 (West 1970); 
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1002(b) (McKinney 1963); FED. R. C1v. P. 20(a); MICH. GEN. Or. 
R. 206; MINN. DIST. Or. R. 20, 
57. Interpleader, originally an equitable proceeding, protects a debtor subject to 
conflicting claims to the same fund or property. H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY 
493 (2d ed. 1948). The debtor, or stakeholder, is permitted to pay the contested pro-
ceeds to an appropriate court and force the contesting claimants to litigate the matter 
between themselves. The procedure is now largely codified by statute or court rule. 
E.g., Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970); CAL. C1v. PRO. CODE§ 386 (West 
1970); N.Y. C1v. PRAc. LAw § 1006 (McKinney 1963); FED. R. C1v, P. 22; M1c11, GEN, 
Or. R. 210; MINN. DIST. CT, R. 22, 
58. Intervention is a procedural device that allows a person not a party to the 
suit to assert a claim or defense in a pending action. See, e.g., Rocca v. Thompson, 223 
U.S. 317, 330 (1912). The intervenor must show that he claims an interest relating to 
the property or transaction that is the subject of the suit and that any disposition of 
the action without his participation would impair his ability to protect that interest, 
Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United 
States, 379 F.2d 818, 825 (5th Cir. 1967), or that his claim or defense and those in-
volved in the main action have a question of law or fact in common. SEC v. United 
States Realty &: Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 458-60 (1940); Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: 
L.E. Ry. Co., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, 
UMW, 7 F.R.D. 251, 254 (W .D. Va. 1943). Intervention is now expressly authorized by 
t9urt rule or statute in most jurisdictions. E.g., CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE § 387 (West 1970); 
N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 1012-13 (McKinney 1963): FED. R. C1v. P. 24; M1cH, GEN. Or. R. 
209; MINN. DIST. CT. R. 24. 
59. In an interpleader action the obligor would become a neutral stakeholder. See 
note 57 supra. 
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potential double liability problems and added court and litigant 
expense. 
The few courts that have dealt with this exception have limited 
it to cases involving third-party assertions of equitable title and have 
excluded third-party assertions of contract defenses.60 The limitation 
is questionable in light of its reliance upon a historical but presently 
meaningless distinction between equitable title claims and contrac-
tual defenses.61 
The Uniform Commercial Code retains the exception in section 
3-306(d): "The claim of any third person to the instrument is not 
otherwise available as a defense to any party liable thereon unless 
the third person himself defends the action for such party;'' The 
Code is ambiguous, however, with respect to the type of third-party 
assertions that can be raised. The language of section 3-306(d) seems 
to adopt the common-law distinction between claims of equitable 
title and contract defenses by referring to "[t]he claim of any third 
party." Moreover, Comment 5 states: "The provision includes all 
claims for rescission of a negotiation, whether based in incapacity, 
fraud, duress, mistake, illegality, breach of trust or duty or any 
other reason. It includes claims based on conditional delivery or 
delivery for a special purpose. It includes claims of legal title, lien, 
constructive trust or other equity against the instrument or its pro-
ceeds."62 All of the examples given in Comment 5 are equitable 
claims.63 This, plus the fact that the Code draftsmen used the his-
torically encumbered term "claim" in sections 3-306(a) and (d), but 
used the term "defenses" in section 3-306(b), provides considerable 
support for arguing that the Code follows the common law and 
limits the exception to equitable title claims. The only case inter-
preting the provision, Fulton National Bank v. Delco Corp.,64 has 
so held.65 
The device used to bring a third party into the suit, so as to 
allow the obligor to raise the third party's equitable title claims 
under section 3-306(d), may be court-ordered or plaintiff-requested 
60. E.g., McAdoo v. Farmers State Bank, 106 Kan. 662, 189 P. 155 (1920); Carnegie 
Trust Co. v. First Natl. Bank, 213 N.Y. 301, 107 N.E. 693 (1915). Cf. Welch v. Bank of 
the Mahattan Co., 264 App. Div. 906, 35 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1942). . 
61. See text at notes 98-104 infra. 
62. Comment 5 also provides that "[n]othing here stated is intended to prevent any 
interplcader, deposit in court or other available procedure under which the defendant 
may bring the claimant into court or be discharged without himself litigating the 
claim as a defense." 
63. See note 29 supra. 
64. 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455 (1973). 
65. "A 'claim' is more than a mere 'defense.' ••• The word descends from the law 
merchant and indicates certain rights in the instrument on which the suit is based 
rather than mere reasons why the alleged debtor is not liable for the fund." 128 Ga. 
App. at 19, 195 S.E.2d at 457. 
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joinder of the third party as a defendant, 66 third-party-initiated in-
tervention, 67 or obligor-initiated interpleader.68 Interpleader-a form 
of equitable relief given to a debtor who is willing to pay but who 
is besieged by adverse claimants on the same debt-is the best alter-
native from the standpoint of the obligor: It allows the obligor to 
assume the position of a passive stakeholder and is initiated at its 
request.69 Furthermore, interpleader is not a true jus tertii defense; 
if it is granted the bank need on1y assert a third party's claim, and 
does not have to prove it. 
In spite of the obvious advantages of interpleader in terms of 
justice and ease of judicial administration, the courts have limited 
the situations in which it may be used. Equity courts originally 
established four stringent requirements for the availability of inter-
pleader: (I) The same debt, duty, or thing must be claimed by 
the adverse parties; (2) the claimants must derive their claims to 
title from a common source; (3) the stakeholder must not assert any 
claim or have any interest in the subject matter; and (4) the stake-
holder must have incurred no independent liability to either of the 
claimants.70 Even after statutory modifications of interpleader rules, 
·several jurisdictions still require that the stakeholder not be under 
an independent liability to one of the parties.71 In those jurisdic-
tions the drawee-bank would apparently be precluded from obtain-
ing interpleader on a claim by a business check payee because of 
its independent liability to the payee as the acceptor or drawee of 
the check. 72 
Although the Code draftsmen apparently favored the use of 
interpleader to force the third party to participate in a suit by the 
payee against the obligor,78 the Code does not provide standards 
or a special statutory basis for the use of _interpleader. The avail-
ability of the device is thus often governed by contradictory local 
law. The resulting confusion is illustrated by two cases from the 
66. See note 56 supra. 
67. See note 58 supra. 
68. See note 57 supra. 
69. See note 57 supra. 
70. H. McCLINroCK, supra note 57, §§ 182-87, at 493-506. The rules originally were 
formulated in J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1322 (1883). See Hazard & Masko-
vitz, An Historical and Critical Analysis of Interpleader, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 706, 725-49 
(1964). 
71. E.g., Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970); Hurlbut v. Shell Oil Co., 
131 F. Supp. 466 (W .D. La. 1955) (construing the Federal Interpleader Act to retain 
the rule that the stakeholder must be under no independent liability to any of the 
claimants). Compare Poland v. Atlantis Credit Corp., 179 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) 
(rule still valid), with Knoll v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977 (1967) (rule no longer valid). 
72. See text at notes 8-17 supra. 
78. See note 62 supra. 
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New York Supreme Court. On similar facts one court expressly 
denied interpleader in a bank check dispute,74 while another allowed 
interpleader in a certified check dispute.75 A clear provision in the 
Code specifying interpleader requirements is needed to implement 
the drafters' policy intentions. 
A further complication on the use of interpleader is the con-
fusion of at least one court, and possibly several others,76 over the 
application of the "stop payment" concept. In Ruskin v. Central 
Federal Savings & Loan Assn.,77 the defendant savings bank issued 
a teller's check for its customer and later withheld payment at the 
customer's request. The court, ·without discussing the possibility of 
allowing the bank to raise a jus tertii defense, denied interpleader 
and granted summary judgment for the payee, stating that a teller's 
check was accepted as the equivalent of. cash and could not be 
countermanded.78 The court reasoned that "the defendant had no 
right to stop payment on the check. . . . [T]he defendant is pri-
marily liable to the plaintiff and is not a stakeholder besieged by 
adverse claimants since . . . the bank could not be liable to its 
depositor."79 By holding that the third party had no claim to the 
instrument the court found that one of the crucial requirements 
of interpleader was lacking, because the parties did not claim the 
same debt, duty, or thing.80 But, while the court was correct in 
asserting that the bank customer does not have the authority to 
issue a stop-payment order on a business check, the court was in-
correct in asserting that this lack of authority deprives the third 
party of the status of an adverse claimant. At common law and 
under the Code, a party who has been defrauded on an instrument 
can assert an "adverse claim" against the funds in the bank to pro-
74. Ruskin v. Central Fed. Sav, 8: Loan Assn., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 150 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1966), See text at notes 77-78 infra. 
75. Lincoln Sec. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 8 UCC REP. SERv. 215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1970), The drawee-bank of a certified check stopped payment at the i-equest of its 
customer, who claimed that the check was obtained by the payee in a fraudulent 
transaction. The court, citing two common law cases, Greenberg v. World Exch. Bank, 
277 App. Div. 413,237 N.Y.S. 200 (1929), and Llop v. First Natl. Bank, 178 Misc. 436, 35 
N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1942), stated that "where the drawer notifies the bank that 
there is substantial possibility of fraud in connection with the transaction, inter-
pleader has been held proper." 8 UCC REP. SERv. at 216. 
76. Several cases have arisen under the Code with fact situations that would allow 
a jus tertii defense. However, it is not clear from the opinions whether such a defense 
was properly asscrted, and the court summarily decided the cases on the ground that 
the customer had no right to stop payment. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D,N.Y. 1973); National Newark 8: Essex Bank v. Giordano, 
111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (Super, Ct. 1970); Malphrus v. Home Sav. Bank, 44 
Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S. 2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965). 
77. 3 UCC REP. SERV. 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). 
78. 3 UCC REP. SERv. at 151. 
79, 3 UCC REP. SERV, at 152. 
80. 3 UCC REP. SERv. at 152. See text at notes 70,72 supra. 
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tect his equitable claim of ownership.81 The crucial issue is not 
whether a third party can stop payment, but whether the third party 
is or can be.a valid "adverse claimant." 
The court's failure to recognize the adverse claim doctrine is 
especially serious when the double aspect of that doctrine is con-
sidered. An adverse claim is both a requirement of the bank's 
interpleader action and a mechanism by which a customer creates 
an obligation in the bank not to honor a demand for payment in 
certain circumstances. If the bank ignores an adverse claim and pays 
an instrument possessor, the claimant can sue the bank for the face 
value of the check.82 The bank faced with an adverse claim need 
not argue jus tertii; it can suspend payment simply on the basis 
that it is subject to a conflicting claim. At common law an adverse 
claim was quite easy to assert; the third-party claimant, upon noti-
fying the obligor, bound the obligor to withhold payment on the 
instrument for a reasonable length of time, allowing the third party 
to press his claims against the payee in court.83 Common law cases 
explicitly applied the doctrine to the business check situation.84 The 
"claims-defenses" distinction85 again proved crucial, however, for the 
third-party claimant under the common law must have asserted a 
legal or equitable claim of ownership, as opposed to a contractual 
defense.86 
The Code allows adverse claims to be made under section 3-603, 
which is significantly more restrictive than the common law. Under 
that section the bank is discharged from liability to the extent that 
it has made payment, even if it had knowledge of an adverse claim 
to the instrument by another person. However, the obligor is re-
quired to withhold payment in recognition of an adverse claim in 
two situations: where the adverse claimant obtains an injunction 
against payment to the current holder of the instrument in an action 
in which both the adverse claimant and the current holder of the 
instrument are parties, and where the adverse claimant supplies the 
bank with indemnity. An illustrative case under the first situation 
81. See text at notes 82-101 infra. 
82. E.g., Gendler v. Sibley State Bank, 62 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Iowa 1945); Nielsen v. 
Planters Trust & Sav. Bank, 183 La. 645, 164 S. 613 (1935); Brunswick v. Peoples Sav. 
Bank, 194 Mo. App. 360, 190 S.W. 60 (1916); Miller v. Bank of Washington, 176 N.C. 
152, 96 S.E. 977 (1918); Huff v. Oklahoma State Bank, 87 Okla. 7, 207 P. 963 (1922). 
83. J. BRADY, supra note 8, at 276-77; 5A THE MICHIE Co., BANKS AND BANKING 
§ 82 (1950); 2 T. PATON, supra note 42, at 1656-59. 
84. E.g., Greenberg v. World Exch. Bank, 277 App. Div. 413, 237 N.Y.S. 200 (1929): 
Llop v. First Natl, Bank, 178 Misc. 436, 35 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1942). 
85. See note 29 supra. 
86. E.g., First State Bank & Trust Co. v. First Natl. Bank, 314 Ill. 269, 145 N.E. 382 
(1924); Nielsen v. Planters Trust & Sav. Bank, 183 La. 645, 164 S. 613 (1935); Peter 
Adams Co. v. National Shoe & Leather Bank, 9 N.Y.S. 75 (Sup. Ct, 1887); First NaU, 
l3anl-- v. Bache, 71 Pa. 213 (1872), 
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is Jefferies & Co. v. Arkus-Duntov.87 The plaintiff, a stockbroker, 
purchased securities from the two defendants with certified checks, 
intending to resell the securities to its customers. The sale turned 
out to be part of the Equity Funding scandal, and it was discovered 
that the securities had been sold by the defendant in violation of 
the securities laws. The plaintiff's customer refused to accept delivery 
on the stocks, and the plaintiff became a "forced purchaser." The 
plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order and later an injunc-
tion against payment _ on the checks to the defendant Duntov, 
although a similar injunction with respect to the other defendant, 
a holder in due course, was denied. 88 The court also ordered Duntov 
to return the check to the plaintiff, on the condition that the plain-
tiff post an indemnity bond.89 
There are serious shortcomings in the Code provision regarding 
the use of an injunction to assert an adverse claim. The injunction 
must be brought against the current holder of the instrument, who 
may be beyond the reach of process. Furthermore, the Code provides 
no standards to govern the issuance of an injunction; a decision on 
whether to grant one may turn on the peculiarities of local law or 
the unpredictable discretion of the courts.90 Stringent requirements 
may effectively block the buyer's assertion of adverse claims.91 
In section 3-603(1) the Code allows a party to establish an ad-
verse claim without an injunction if he provides indemnity deemed 
adequate by the bank. The indemnity is intended to protect the 
bank against any loss it might incur in a suit by the payee for the 
wrongful refusal of payment on his check, assuming that the adverse 
claim is judged invalid.92 -The Code apparently intends that upon 
posting of the indemnity the claimant will be joined or interpleaded 
into any suit brought by the payee, or that the claimant will initiate 
his ovm. suit against the payee to assert the adverse claim. 
In National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano,93 the only case 
dealing with the indemnity provision, the defendant had purchased 
87. 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
88. 357 F. Supp. at 1216. 
89. 357 F. Supp. at 1216. 
90. In Jefferies, for example, the court relied on cases involving the general dis• 
cretionary injunctive power of the federal courts. 357 F. Supp. at 1215-16. 
91. An interlocutory injunction has not been regarded as a matter of right, even 
if the plaintiff faces irreparable injury. Pritchett v. Wade, 261 Ala. 156, 162, 73 S.2d 
533, 537-38 (1954); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Maloney, 121 Cal. App. 2d 33, 43, 
262 P.2d 662, 668 (1953); Smith v. Kansas City, 167 Kan. 684, 689-90, 208 P.2d 233, 238 
(1949); Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Hamlen, 141 N.J. Eq. 217, 219-30, 56 A.2d 722, 
724 (Ch. 1948), 
92. The indemnity provision in UCC § 3-603(1) is a carryover from state adverse 
claim statutes designed to protect banks from possible double liability. 2 T. PATON, 
supra note 42, at 1657. 
93. 111 N.J. Super. M7, 268 A.2d 327 (1970). 
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two trucks from the seller by obtaining a loan from the plaintiff 
bank. The defendant gave the bank an installment sale security 
agreement94 in exchange for a cashier's check payable to the seller. 
After the check had been delivered to the seller, the defendant-
buyer found the trucks to be defective and asked the bank to with-
hold payment on the check. The bank refused, even though the 
defendant offered to post an indemnity bond. The defendant then 
refused to pay on the installment agreement, and the bank brought 
suit. The court held that, since there is no right to stop payment 
on a cashier's check, the defendant was liable for his breach of the 
installment contract.95 The court failed to consider whether the 
bank had a duty to withhold payment under section 3-603. Al-
though it could be argued that the result was correct, because the 
defendant asserted a defense to the installment contract and not 
an adverse claim to the check funds,96 the court's reasoning indi-
cated a fundamental misunderstanding: The fact that payment can-
not be stopped on a business check does not affect a party's right 
to assert an adverse claim under section 3-603. 
The major difficulty with the indemnity provision is its vague-
ness. The indemnity need only be "deemed adequate by the party 
seeking the discharge." A bank could apparently waive its indem-
nity rights by accepting a trifling sum, in effect requiring only 
notice. Alternatively, the bank might not accept any amount as 
adequate, nullifying the provision entirely. A "reasonableness" re-
quirement could be read into the section, but if courts must second-
guess bank decisions on the adequacy of the indemnity, much of 
the effectiveness of section 3-603 will be lost. 
Section 3-603 continues to adhere to the common-law distinc-
tion between "claims" and "defenses."97 The section refers to the 
"claim of another person," and section 1-103 makes the common 
law applicable to Code provisions if not "displaced by the partic-
ular provisions of [the] Act." Although many cases of consumer 
dissatisfaction involve fraud, allowing the assertion of adverse claims 
based on equitable title, more often a third party will claim failure 
of consideration, breach of warranty, or unconscionability. These 
are contract defenses and are insufficient to give rise to an adverse 
claim under section 3-603. 
In sum, the law on jus tertii and adverse claims allows a bank 
94. In an installment sale security agreement the purchaser of the check obtains a 
loan from the bank for the amount of the check. The bank files a security interest 
agreement on the assets that the customer purchases with the check. See UCC §§ 9-105, 
-201. The purchaser must repay the loan installments or the bank can repossess the 
purchased items. See UCC § 9-501 to -505. 
95. Ill N.J. Super. at 352, 268 A.2d at 329. 
96. See text at notes 97-98 infra. 
97. See text at notes 85-86 supra. 
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that voluntarily withholds payment on a business check to assert 
the legal title claims of its customer, as well as equitable title claims 
if the customer is joined in the suit. If the bank refuses to comply 
voluntarily with a customer's request to withhold payment, the 
customer may force the bank to withhold by obtaining an injunc-
tion or by posting an indemnity bond. There is considerable con-
fusion in the courts over the mechanics of third-party claims on 
funds credited to business checks, probably stemming from the Code's 
ambiguity. The right to interpleader under section 3-306(d), the 
standards for granting an injunction under section 3-603(1), the 
mechanics of the indemnity bond provision in section 3-306(1), 
and the "claims-defense" distinction under sections 3-306 and 3-
603(1) are unspecified, and left to common-law doctrines for reso-
lution. The common-law doctrines are inconsistent and may frus-
trate Code policy. At the very least, then, the Code must be 
amended to clarify these ambiguities. 
Furthermore, modem commercial practice requires two substan-
tive changes in the rights of the parties in an adverse-claim situation. 
First, the common-law distinction benv-een "claims" and "defenses" 
should be eliminated. Many cases of consumer dissatisfaction rest 
on failure of consideration, breach of warranty, or unconscionability, 
which are insufficient to establish the claim of ownership required 
under the adverse-claim statute. There is no sound reason for the 
distinction: A valid defense defeats the payee-seller's right to pay-
ment just as effectively as a superior equitable claim of ownership.98 
The adverse-claim action was originally an adaptation of an action 
in trover, used to regain physical possession of an instrument,99 but 
it is presently used to avoid a contractual obligation by withholding 
payment on a check possessed by an alleged wrongdoer.100 Modem 
commercial policy should protect against breach of warranty, failure 
of consideration, or unconscionable business dealings as much as 
against fraud, illegality, or theft.101 Indeed, the distinction between 
fraud, which gives rise to a claim of equitable title in the defrauded 
party, and unconscionability is only a matter of degree, and the 
concepts have been used interchangeably.102 Fraud and breach of 
98. See, e.g., Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co. v. Raines, 125 Ga. App. 263, 187 S.E.2d 
320 (1972) (failure of consideration); Northern Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Gates, 196 
N.W.2d 70 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1972) (breach of warranty); UCC §§ 306(b)•(c). 
99, See note 29 supra. 
100. See Fulton Natl. Bank v. Delco Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455 (1973); 
Bathgate v. Exchange Bank, 199 Mo. App. 583, 205 S.W. 875 (1918); Welch v. Bank of 
the Manhattan Co., 264 App. Div. 906, 35 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1942). 
IOI. See Comment, Adverse Claims and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protection 
Available1, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 915, 924•25 (1973). 
102. 1 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACTS § 128, at 551 (1963); Note, Unconscionable Business 
Contracts: A Doctrine Gone Awry, 70 YALE L.J. 453, 453 (1961). See, e.g., Schaeffer v. 
Moore, 262 S.W .2d 854 (Mo. 1953). 
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warranty are also basically similar in their development; both were 
derived from the early tort action of deceit.103 Although elimination 
of the claims-defenses distinction may hinder the negotiability of 
business checks by enlarging the class of buyers that can make use 
of the adverse-claim procedure,104 protection from frivolous payment 
stoppages by consumers is an argument for generally expanding 
seller protections, not for continuing an outmoded common-law 
distinction. 
Second, th~ third-party claimant should not be able to assert an 
adverse claim simply by posting indemnity "deemed adequate" by 
the bank, or by otherwise inducing the bank voluntarily to with-
hold payment on the instrument. The third-party claimant should 
instead be required to initiate suit to protect his claims. This would 
aid the efficient settlement of commercial disputes in jurisdictions 
that adhere to the "no independent liability" doctrine and thus 
refuse to allow interpleader when the payee brings suit against the 
bank on the instrument.105 In those jurisdictions the bank must 
convince the court to order joinder, which may not even be avail-
able, or the third party must voluntarily intervene, if the claims 
of all parties are to be adjudicated in one proceeding.100 Moreover, 
the importance of the free flow and negotiability of business checks 
in commercial transactions107 militates against allowing the bank 
customer routinely to defeat payment on those instruments. If the 
buyer wants stop-payment rights he should negotiate to pay by per-
sonal check. By agreeing to pay by business check he waives his 
right to stop payment, and he should be forced to initiate court 
action to redress his claims. Allowing the buyer to persuade a bank 
to withold payment voluntarily, or to waive its indemnity rights 
under the Code, decreases the certainty that business checks will be 
honored and detracts from their value as commercial tools. The 
buyer would still be able to prevent immediate dissipation of the 
funds credited to a business check by obtaining a court injunction. 
Similarly, some cases have held that gross inadequacy of consideration is conclusive 
evidence of fraud. E.g., Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 71 P.2d 220 (1937); Size• 
more v. Miller, 196 Ore. 89, 247 P.2d 224 (1952); Te.'Cas Employers Ins. Assn. v. Kelly, 
261 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1953); Jackson v. Seymour, 193 Va. 735, 71 S.E.2d 
181 (1952). 
103. See l T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 374.75 (1906); Note, War-
ranty: Tort and Contract Characterization: Statutes of Limitation, 43 CAL, L REV, 
546, 549 (1955); Note, Necessity for Privity of Contract in Warranties by Representation, 
42 HARv. L. REv. 414, 414-15 (1929). 
104. See Comment, supra note 101, at 923. 
105. See text at notes 70-72 supra. 
106. See notes 56, 58 supra. 
107. See Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973); Jefferies &: Co. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Na-
tional Newark &: Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 352, 268 A.2d 327, 329 
(1970). 
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To effectuate the needed clarification in the area, to eliminate 
the "claim-defense" distinction, and to require the adverse claimant 
to initiate court action, sections 3-306(d) and 3-603 might be re-
drafted as follows [the bracketed phrases are language in the present 
provisions that should be deleted; the underlined phrases should be 
added]: 
§ 3-603. Payment or Satisfaction 
{I} The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his 
payment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is made with 
knowledge of a claim or defense of another person to the instru-
ment unless prior to such payment or satisfaction the person [making 
the] asserting such claim or defense [either supplies indemnity deemed 
adequate by the party seeking the discharge or enjoins payment or 
satisfaction by order of a court of competent jurisdiction in an 
action in which the adverse claimant and the holder are parties.] 
enjoins such payment or satisfaction by order of a court pursuant 
to subsection (2). This subsection does not, however, result in the 
discharge of the liability · 
(a} of a party who in bad faith pays or · satisfies a holder who 
acquired the instrument by theft or who (unless having the 
rights of a holder in due course) holds through one who so 
acquired it; or 
(b} of a party ( other than an intermediary bank or a payor bank 
which is not a depository bank} who pays or satisfies the 
holder of an instrument which has been restrictively indorsed 
in a manner not consistent with the terms of such restrictive 
indorsement. 
(2) Any court of general jurisdiction of this state shall issue an 
order to ·withhold payment on any instrument, order the bank on 
which the instrument was dra·wn to deposit the funds represented 
by the instrument into the court, order the bank discharged from 
liability in whole or in part to any party, and set the cause for 
trial to determine the validity of the claim or defense, whenever 
(a} any party files a complaint and affidavit with the court stating 
that he: 
(i} has a claim of ownership, a claim of re~titution, or a 
defense that would defeat the present holder's right to 
payment on the contractual obligation underlying the 
instrument; and 
(ii) will deposit ·with the court, if the court so requires, a 
bond equal to twice the face value of the instrument; and 
(iii) has caused the present holder of the instrument to be 
served with a copy of the complaint; or 
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(b) any party files a complaint and affidavit with the court stating 
that he: 
(i) has a claim of ownership, a claim of restitution, or a 
defense that would defeat the present holder's right to 
payment on the contractual obligation underlying the in-
strument; and 
(ii) will deposit with the court, if the court so requires, a 
bond equal to twice the face value of the instrument; and 
(iii) has been unable, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
to cause the present holder of the instrument to be served 
with a copy of the complaint; and 
(iv) will bring suit on the claim as specified in the complaint 
as soon as jurisdiction over the holder's person can be 
obtained. 
I£ the court finds the claim or defense invalid, it shall have the 
discretion to award to the holder court costs, reasonable attorney's 
fees, and consequential damages. 
[(2)] (3) Payment or satisfaction may be made with the consent 
of the holder by any person including a stranger to the instrument. 
Surrender of the instrument to such a person gives him the rights 
of a transferee (Section 3-201). 
§ 3-306. Rights of One Not Holder in Due Course 
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person 
takes the instrument subject to 
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the 
instrument acquired it by theft, or that payment or satisfac-
tion to such holder would be inconsistent with the terms of a 
restrictive indorsement. The claim of any third person to the 
instrument is not othenvise available as a defense to any party 
liable thereon [unless the third person himself defends the 
action £or such party.], subject to the provisions of § 3-603. 
The redrafting would allow a third party to block payment on 
a business check only after obtaining an injunction directed to the 
obligor bank. The injunction would issue on the assertion of a claim 
of equitable title to the check and/or a contract defense on the in-
strument's underlying obligation. Upon the issuance of the injunc-
tion the obligor bank is ordered to relinquish the funds credited 
on the instrument to the court, and is discharged from all further 
liability on the instrument. If the court questions the solvency or 
the good faith of the third party, it may condition its injunction 
on the third party's posting of a bond. If the third party's allega-
tions are not sustained, the court may award court costs, attorney's 
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fees, and consequential damages to the holder, to be paid from the
bond proceeds if a bond has been posted.
The obligor bank cannot raise jus tertii in a suit brought by
the checkholder-seller except to plead that it has been subjected to
a valid injunction obtained pursuant to section 3-603. If an injunc-
tion has been awarded, the bank's liability will have been discharged
under section 3-603, and any suit against it should of course be
dismissed.
Notes
